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This paper assesses how the Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y 
Alimentacion (PROGRESA) program has affected the school enrollment of Mexican 
youth in the first 15 months of its operation. PROGRESA provides poor mothers in poor 
rural communities with education grants, if their children attend school regularly. 
Enrollment rates are compared between groups of poor children who reside in 
communities randomly selected to participate in the initial phase of the PROGRESA 
program and those who reside in other comparably poor (control) communities. Pre-
program comparisons document how well the randomized design is implemented, and 
double-differenced estimators are reported over time within this panel of children. Probit 
models are then estimated for the probability that an individual child is enrolled, which 
statistically controls for additional characteristics of the child, their parents, local schools, 
and community, and for samples of different compositions, to evaluate the sensitivity of 
the estimated program effects to these variations. If the current relationship of the 
program outlays to enrollments, and that of schooling to increased adult earnings, both 
persist in the future, the internal rate of return to the PROGRESA educational grants as 
an investment is estimated to be about 8 percent, which accrues in addition to the 
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1. OVERVIEW 
Poverty alleviation programs have taken a variety of forms. Social welfare 
programs provide transfers in cash and kind to people with incomes and assets below a 
specified level in most high-income countries. These transfer programs may also impose 
additional conditions and limitations, such as in the United States, where Awelfare@ 
payments are provided primarily to lone mothers with dependent children. These 
conditional transfer programs are likely to distort the allocation of private economic 
resources and thereby reduce the efficiency of the economy. In particular, means-tested 
poverty programs are expected to reduce the time beneficiaries work in the paid labor 
force, because the earnings from paid work of beneficiaries is taxed at a higher rate than 
is the earnings of nonbeneficiaries. Other distortions in behavior are also attributed to 
these programs, although the evidence is more controversial. For example, in the United 
States, those states that provide more generous welfare payments also report, on average, 
less frequent marriage and more nonmarital childbearing (e.g., Rosenzweig 1999), which 
could be attributed to these programs that support only mothers without a resident 
husband. 
In populations engaged in agriculture, poverty alleviation programs have often 
taken the form of setting minimum prices for farm outputs or paying subsidies for farm 
inputs. Two frequently heard justifications for these programs are, first, farm incomes 
are, on average, lower than nonfarm incomes, and second, farm prices are volatile, 
causing farm incomes, before transfers and taxes, to vary more over time than nonfarm 2 
incomes. But in contrast to means-tested income supports in welfare programs, 
agricultural price supports are generally not specifically targeted to poor families, but 
only to a relatively poor occupation or industry. Farm price supports also contribute to an 
inefficient allocation of resources by encouraging the production of outputs of less 
economic value than would otherwise occur, including the allocation of more labor and 
capital to the production of price-supported commodities and a corresponding reduction 
in the rate of net migration out of agriculture. As a result, consumers usually pay a higher 
price for farm products, and states subsidize agricultural exports and tax agricultural 
imports.  
In neither the income supplement nor output-price support program is there an 
expectation that beneficiaries will invest more in the acquisition of skills or the 
accumulation of capital to boost their future productivity and consumption, and thus 
diminish their dependence on transfers from the state. Indeed, one consequence of both of 
these types of poverty programs is to erode the workers= incentive to change their sector 
of employment, or accumulate new types of productive job experience, or generally 
invest in human capital. The growing appreciation of the cumulative lifetime career costs 
of these distortions strengthened the dissatisfaction in the United States with its Aid for 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which led to the redesign of this 
program in 1996 to include a lifetime limitation of not more than five years of transfers, 
and to the funding of coordinated childcare and job training programs to encourage poor 
mothers to become self-supporting. 3 
The Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion (PROGRESA) 
program in Mexico, which is examined in this paper, takes a different approach to 
poverty reduction by subsidizing the investment of poor families in their children=s 
human capital. It provides means-tested transfers to poor rural mothers, whose children 
are enrolled in school from grades 3 through 9. The program seeks to reduce the current 
level of poverty in Mexico and to increase the schooling, and thereby the future 
productivity, of children from poor rural families. This anti-poverty program started 
paying grants to eligible beneficiaries in September 1998, and by the start of 2000, the 
program had enlisted two million families in Mexico, or about one-tenth of the entire 
Mexican population. The government implemented the program as a phased social 
experiment, collecting sufficient background and follow-up survey information to 
facilitate cost-benefit evaluations of the program. Although the PROGRESA program 
may reduce labor supply of these poor families, to the extent that it increases the incomes 
of poor mothers, it does not impose a further tax on earnings that specifically deters work 
in the market economy. The distortion in resource allocation caused by the PROGRESA 
program is thus minimized to what might be called a pure Aincome effect@ associated with 
achieving the program objective of poverty reduction. But it does not in addition distort 
relative prices or returns from work, marital status, or resource allocation in general by its 
conditions for eligibility. 
One change in resource allocation expected from the PROGRESA Program is an 
increase in the school enrollment of poor children. The objective of this paper is to 
estimate the enrollment impact of the program on children from poor households (i.e., 4 
who are administratively designated as eligible for program benefits) who live in poor 
rural communities that were randomly selected to participate in the first phase of the 
PROGRESA Program (e.g., the treatment). The program impact is inferred from 
comparisons with poor children from randomly selected communities (e.g., the control) 
who did not benefit from the first expansion of the PROGRESA Program. Both the 
Atreatment@ and Acontrol@ populations were surveyed twice in the year before the program 
was announced, and followed for two years after the program commenced, providing a 
total of five survey cycles for this study. There are about 200,000 people in 495 poor 
rural communities originally included in a background census in October 1997, of which 
almost two-thirds of the communities were designated as program Atreatment@ areas in 
September 1998, and in these areas, about two-thirds of the households were judged 
eligible for program benefits or sufficiently Apoor@ according to a combination of initial 
household census and community indicators of consumption, wealth, and income.  
The design of the PROGRESA Program and the initial patterns of enrollment are 
reviewed in Section 2. A framework for studying enrollment decisions is outlined in 
Section 3. Estimates of the difference between treatment and control groups are explored 
in Section 4, whereas the probability of enrollment for the individual child is estimated in 
Section 5. Section 6 combines information on the estimated program enrollment effects, 
the outlays on educational subsidies, and the wage structure to construct the internal rate 
of return realized within the program, assuming its only goal is to invest efficiently in 
educational human capital. It is, of course, more than that, for it also seeks to alleviate 5 
current problems of low levels of consumption among a major group of Mexico=s poorest 
people. 
 
2. PROGRAM MECHANISM, ENROLLMENT PATTERN, AND EVALUATION 
In a low-income rural community in Mexico that is designated as participating in 
the PROGRESA Program, mothers living in an administratively determined Apoor@ 
household whose child is enrolled in grades 3 through 9 could receive from the central 
government a check every two months for the amount indicated in Table 1.
1 The size of 
this educational grant increases fourfold from the third to ninth grade, and they are 
slightly larger for girls than boys at the junior secondary school level, based on the 
concern that enrollment rates of girls lag about six percentage points behind boys at this 
level (see Appendix 2, Table 8). To assess the relative magnitude of these educational 
grants, it is useful to note that a daughter enrolled in the ninth grade might qualify a 
family to receive a grant of 255 pesos per month, which amounts to 44 percent of the 
typical male day-laborer=s wage in these agricultural communities.
2   
                                                 
1 These amounts have increased every six months to adjust for inflation figures reported by the Bank of 
Mexico (Coady and Djebbari 1999). There are additional supports (cash and kind) for school materials of 
120 pesos per year at the primary level and 240 pesos per year at the secondary level, provided on a term-
by-term basis (PROGRESA 1999). 
2 The daily wage for male agricultural labor reported in the 1998 and 1999 Community Surveys averaged 
29 pesos, and the worker is assumed to work 20 days a month to yield a monthly wage of 580 pesos. There 
is an additional monthly transfer per family of 90 pesos, if the mother=s family receives recommended 
periodic health exams, which can lead to further health care, including nutritional supplements and 
immunizations for children as well as pregnant and lactating women (Coady and Djebbari 1999; 
PROGRESA 1999). 6 
Table 1—Monthly payments for PROGRESA Program eligible families for children 
who attend at least 85 percent of days
a 
 
Educational levels of students eligible for payments 
 
July - December 1998
b     









   
 
  70 
  80 
  105 
  135 
   
Secondary School  
1
st Year                Males 
Females 
2
nd Year               Males 
Females 
3
rd Year                Males 
Females 
   
 
  200 
  210 
  210 
  235 
  225 
  255 
Source: PROGRESA Staff. 
a Excluding those days for which medical or parent excuses were obtained, accumulated over the last two 
months. 
b Corresponds to school year first-term, September to December, 1998. 
 
The likelihood that a child is enrolled in school is related to the child=s age and 
years of schooling completed at the end of the prior school year, as illustrated in Table 2. 
Beneath the number of children enumerated in the October 1997 census of households 
and March 1998 survey is the enrollment rate for children in each age-education cell. 
Comparing in Table 2 the marginal column on the right that represents the age-specific 
enrollment rates, and the bottom row that represents the grade-completed enrollment 
rates, it is evident that enrollment rates are more sensitive to grade than age. The primary 
school enrollment rate among children who had completed grades 1 through 5 is about 95 
percent, and recovers to 97 percent after a child completes the first year of junior 
secondary school or seventh grade. In the transition year from elementary to junior 
secondary school, however, the enrollment rate falls to 58 percent, after completing the 7 
Table 2—Distribution of children age 6 to 16 in October 1997 and March 1998 in 
panel sample, by age and years of schooling completed in previous year 
  (beneath the number of children in each cell is the proportion of that cell 
enrolled) 
Source: Estimated by the author on the two pre-program rounds of the survey for only children who are matched in all 
five rounds or the Panel Sample. 
 
sixth grade, and drops again to 63 percent in the first year of senior secondary school. 
This analysis focuses, therefore, on enrollment rates within groups of children stratified 
by the number of grades they have completed. This partitioning of the sample also 
facilitates estimation of program effects, for in order to qualify for a PROGRESA 
educational grant, a child must have completed the second to eighth grades and be 
currently enrolled. 
  Years of education completed 
Age  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Total 
                       
  6    2,979    758    51    1      2    1    1        3,793 
    0.927    0.975    0.941    1.000      1.000    1.000    1.000        0.937 
  7    1,252    2,434    492    40      1      1        4,220 
    0.908    0.996    0.988    0.975      1.000      1.000        0.969 
  8    386    1,618    1,986    479    32    1      1        4,503 
    0.837    0.989    0.993    0.990    1.000    1.000      1.000        0.978 
  9    131    552    1,476    1,659    331    38    2    1        4,190 
    0.649    0.984    0.984    0.993    0.991    1.000    1.000    0.000        0.978 
  10    106    228    657    1,568    1,602    389    28    1    1    1    4581 
    0.519    0.939    0.973    0.984    0.991    0.987    0.857    1.000    1.000    1.000    0.971 
  11    73    73    295    692    1,458    1,451    281    19    1      4343 
    0.397    0.918    0.963    0.964    0.986    0.986    0.904    1.000    1.000      0.964 
  12    74    64    168    401    851    1,346    1284    230    14      4,432 
    0.405    0.734    0.869    0.898    0.949    0.969    0.780    0.983    1.000      0.888 
  13    64    75    101    169    349    723    1,463    715    155    17    3,831 
    0.219    0.773    0.733    0.757    0.891    0.934    0.586    0.969    0.974    0.647    0.776 
  14    50    54    82    115    183    378    1,128    601    567    104    3,262 
    0.160    0.722    0.354    0.626    0.754    0.836    0.389    0.942    0.975    0.731    0.685 
  15    18    25    31    45    76    138    556    229    260    221    1,599 
    0.278    0.940    0.548    0.444    0.553    0.739    0.318    0.934    0.954    0.588    0.610 
  16    4    1    7    7    2    13    57    15    26    31    163 
    0.000    1.000    0.571    0.000    0.000    0.462    0.228    0.800    0.923    0.581    0.479 
Total    5,137    5,882    5,346    5,176    4,884    4,480    4,800    1,814    1,024    374   38,917 
    0.866    0.978    0.964    0.957    0.959    0.951    0.577    0.956    0.969    0.631    0.899 8 
Two samples are analyzed from the base census and follow-up surveys: a 
balanced Apanel@ and a Apooled@ sample. The panel sample includes all children age 5 to 
16 observed in the October 1997 household census who completed the age, schooling, 
and enrollment questions, for whom the schooling of co-resident parents is reported, and 
the locality is matched to other community information files. The panel sample is further 
restricted to include only those children who could be followed and matched in the 
subsequent pre-program survey round in March 1998, and then in three surveys in 
October 1998, May 1999, and November 1999, which occurred after the PROGRESA 
Program had started to provide education grants.  
The second larger pooled sample includes all children age 5 to 18 who are 
observed at least once and can be linked to sufficient household data to estimate the basic 
enrollment model.
3 When a specific variable is not reported by the household or missing 
for one of the 495 localities, a dummy variable is included to reflect the missing status of 
this variable, to avoid selecting the estimation sample on the basis of reporting 
characteristics. The working sample includes 314 localities where PROGRESA began to 
operate after the summer of 1998 and 181 non-PROGRESA (control) localities. These 
localities span the poorest regions of seven states of Mexico: Hidalgo, Michoacan, 
                                                 
3 In the fifth round of the survey, information was collected on resident children up to age 18, rather than 
only to age 16 as in the previous four survey rounds. These observations on older children are retained in 
the analysis, and additional age dummies are added for age 17 or 18 in the estimates of probit models for 
enrollment probabilities. Because of the 6 -to-16-age limitation in rounds 2 through 4, the sample of 
children in the highest grade group, 9 or more, and probably also the lowest grade group, with no years of 
schooling completed, are truncated and may therefore be unrepresentative of the entire population, 
particularly in the panel sample. The differenced estimators should therefore be approached with caution as 
they relate to the groups of children with zero and 9 or more grades of school completed.9 
Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Veracruz, and Guerrero.
4 The number of children age 
5 to 16 enumerated in the first census is 40,959, and the number for which all five survey 
observations are matched is 19,716. Appendix 2, Table 8 reports the mean and standard 
deviation of the variables considered in the analysis for the panel and pooled samples, 
divided by males and females, separately for primary and secondary school levels. 
Each locality has its own primary school, and its teacher-to-student ratio is 
examined as a crude indicator of school quality. Only about a quarter of the localities has 
its own junior secondary school, and thus the distance from the locality to the nearest 
such school is considered as an indicator of the time costs that a child and family could 
take into account in determining whether to enroll in junior secondary school.
5 Finally, 
two variables are included to capture the remoteness of the community from an urban 
labor market: the road distance to (1) the Cabeceras or the municipal administrative 
center (sample mean = 10 kilometers), and (2) the nearest of the 39 largest metropolitan 
areas in Mexico (sample mean = 104 kilometers). Workers in urban labor markets tend to 
receive higher wages, and perhaps a larger wage premium for schooling. Greater  
                                                 
4 The procedure used in the program to select a locality as a PROGRESA program areas, and the 
procedures used to designate a household as poor are described and analyzed elsewhere (Skoufias, Davis, 
and Behrman 1999; Behrman and Todd 1999).
5 The characteristics of the secondary school cannot be matched because some students traveled to schools 
that were not designated as nearest, and thus were not included in the database on schools. Thus, some 
students traveled longer distances to reach a preferred junior secondary school than is attributed to them 
according to the available government data. 10 
distances should translate therefore into poorer local job opportunities and lower 
opportunity costs of the time of school-age children, but on the other hand, larger 
distances to urban areas would raise the costs of migration to these markets and probably 
reduce the information available locally about the higher educational returns in the urban 
labor force. In Latin America, as elsewhere, better educated youth are more likely to 
migrate from their rural birthplace to an urban area, once they reach maturity (Schultz 
1988). 
The years of schooling completed by the mother and father are also treated as 
likely determinants of a child=s school enrollment probability.
6 Information on family 
income is not directly included as a control variable, because household monetized 
income is influenced by the labor force behavior of the mother and other family 
members, including the children themselves.
7 The pre-program realized income would 
therefore be behaviorally interrelated with the family=s school enrollment decisions and 
the net relationship would not provide an unbiased estimate of the one-way causal effect 
of income on enrollment. Measures of post-program earned income could be expected to 
                                                 
6 Two dummy variables are also included to indicate if the parental education information is not available 
because the mother or father is not enumerated in the household. This procedure controls for the effect of 
lone parents, although I would prefer to deal with this variation in household composition as another jointly 
determined aspect of the coping strategies of women and their families. Exclusion of children without a 
father in the household would reduce the size of the child panel sample by about 12 percent and exclusion 
of those without a mother of the child would have reduced the sample by 5 percent (Appendix 2, Table 8). 
Thus, elimination of this source of variation by excluding all but intact parental couples could have 
introduced substantial sample selection bias and potential parameter bias in the subsequent estimation of 
program effects. 
7 Preliminary analyses of family labor supply responses to the PROGRESA Program suggest small effects.  
Some reduction is found for child labor, offset by small increases in male adult labor supply, and little 
change in female adult labor force participation (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999, 2000). 11 
respond further to the program=s effect on enrollment itself. Indeed, later the response of 
child labor to the PROGRESA experiment is explicitly considered. However, a latent 
variable index for household economic well-being is constructed from the 1997 regional 
census, from information on household consumption, assets, and income. Because the 
PROGRESA Program used this index to determine a binary indicator of whether the 
household is sufficiently Apoor@ to be eligible for program benefits, this eligibility 
indicator, E, is treated as an exogenous conditioning variable for the enrollment decision 
in both the subsequent analysis of enrollment differences at the group level, and the 
enrollment probabilities estimated at the individual child level. 
 
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT DECISIONS 
The framework helps to connect the subsequent analyses, first at the group level 
and then at the individual child level, suggesting individual, family, community, school, 
and program administrative variables that might influence the likelihood that a specific 
child or a group of children enroll in school.
8 Let the probability of being enrolled in 
school for the ith child at the time of a survey be denoted as Si. This likelihood of 
enrollment is affected by family demand for schooling, which may respond to such 
factors as school quality and access, the opportunity cost of the student=s time minus 
                                                 
8 Virtually all of the reported variation in school attendance is accounted for by the variation in enrollment 
that is analyzed here. Elsewhere, I describe the role of the same explanatory factors to account for the 
variation in attendance rates among the children who report being enrolled and answering the attendance 
question (Schultz 2000a). See Appendix 2, Table 8 for the magnitudes of attendance for the responding 
sample.12 
enrollment subsidies provided after the start of PROGRESA, by household endowments 
and parent education, and a host of unobserved factors, such as those affecting the local 
labor market wage returns to schooling, and the family=s own preferences for schooling. 
If the process determining enrollment outcomes is approximated by the probit model, and 
the unobserved determinants of enrollment combined with various specification and 
stochastic errors create a normally distributed disturbance that is unrelated to the 
observed variables used to explain enrollment behavior, the probit model can be used to 
describe the enrollment decision process and its parameters estimated by maximum 
likelihood methods. The standard errors of these probit estimates are adjusted for the 
clustering at the locality level of the explanatory variables representing the program, 
school, and other community characteristics, which is analogous to the White adjustment 
for heteroscedasticity.
9 
A linear approximation of the estimated enrollment model can be expressed as 
follows: 






b g a a a a ￿ ￿   +   E   P   +   E   +   P   +     =   S   i i 3 i 2 i 1 0 i  
                    i =1,2...,n   (1) 
 
 
where i indexes the child, n represents the total number of children in the cross sectional 
survey, and the explanatory variables and the interpretation of their linearized effects on 
                                                 
9 The probit models were also estimated assuming that random errors differed in their variances across 
families and this source of heteroscedasticity was thus shared by siblings, without modifying any of the 
basic findings discussed here. The Huber (1967) -White adjustment of the estimates for community cluster 
(n = 495) e ffects increased modestly the standard errors, which are used here to calculate the absolute 
values of the asymptotic t ratios.13 
enrollments are discussed below, i.e., derivatives of the probit function evaluated at 
sample means. 
First, there may be an effect on enrollments, a1 , associated with residing in a 
PROGRESA locality, Pi = 1 (otherwise zero), although the random assignment of the 
community locations for the PROGRESA Program is designed to minimize any such 
difference before the program informed the community of who would benefit from the 
Program. There may also be an effect, a2, of being designated as a child from a poor 
household, Ei = 1 (otherwise zero), who would be eligible for PROGRESA benefits when 
the transfer payments are initiated, if the family resides in a PROGRESA locality. One 
common hypothesis is that credit constraints limit the investment of the poor in their 
children=s education, suggesting that a2 would be negative. An interaction binary variable 
defined as the product of the PROGRESA and poor variables, Pi Ei , would then exert an 
additional effect on enrollment denoted a3 , which should be approximately zero until the 
program transfer payments are announced, and thereafter it is expected to be positive. 
Having controlled for the two-way interaction effect, the direct effect of the PROGRESA 
Program for those who are not eligible for the educational grants, or a1 , might be small 
even after the program has started, possibly capturing Aspillover effects@ between poor 
and rich families in PROGRESA-served communities and errors in program 
administration. Enrollment rates vary across grades in a school system (see Table 2), and 
thus a control is needed for the grade level to which the child would be qualified to 
enroll. The variable Ck is defined as 1 if the child has completed precisely k years of 14 
school, k = 0, 1, ..., 8, 9 or more, which would qualify the child to enroll in the k + 1 
grade, and the coefficients on these dummy variables , gk , adjust for linear differences in 
enrollment by grade level.
10   
With the passage of time, some variables that explain the probability of 
enrollment in equation (1) may change, such as C, which would change if a child 
completes one grade of schooling and is thus qualified to enroll in the next. The net effect 
of all unobserved variables that change over time is partially captured in the probit model 
by allowing a shift in the estimated intercept specific to each time period or survey cycle. 
In other words, a0t is allowed to vary in each round of the survey, where t = 1,2,3,4,5. 
Because PROGRESA grants only started in September 1998, and the program effects on 
enrollments represented by the coefficients on P and PE are estimated as an additional set 
of interaction effects for the post-program periods in October 1998, May 1999, and 
November 1999 (t = 3, 4, and 5, respectively), and the estimated post-program effects are 
distinguished by asterisks in the enrollment equation (2) that combines all five survey 
cross sections:  
      ( ) ￿ ￿
K
= =







kit k i i i i
t
ot it C S g a a a a  
( ) ( ) ￿ ￿
= =










it jit j i i t i t e b a a .  (2) 
                                                 
10 A three-way interaction effect between P, E, and Ck for the years when the program offers an educational 
grant for students in grades,  k = 2, 3, ... , 8, was also introduced to demarcate the targeted range of 
educational subsidies, but they are not precisely defined by the available data and are not reported (see 
Schultz 2000b).15 
Equation (2) is estimated separately for boys and girls, because the probit 
parameters differ significantly by gender, particularly at the secondary school level. 
Given the relatively high level of enrollment at the primary level and the sharp decline in 
enrollment at the transition to the secondary level, the two levels are estimated separately. 
The primary sample is defined as all children age 6 to 16 who report Ckt < 6, indicating 
that they have not yet completed primary school, and the secondary sample is defined as 
all children age 6 to 18 who report Ckt >5. It is assumed that PROGRESA=s effect on 
enrollment is uniform by school level across grades, when the probit model for equation 
(2) is estimated at the individual level but is allowed to vary by grade level in the group-
differences. 
If the J control variables, X, were uncorrelated in each time period with the 
program designated localities, P, and the eligibility of the poor, E, the program effect on 
enrollment could be obtained directly by stratifying the population by E and P and 
observing the incremental effect of P and PE in the periods after the program started to 
make educational awards. Figure 1 illustrates the implied four-way stratification of the 
population of children for the purposes of calculating an enrollment rate, Sgt, g = 1,2,3,4. 
The program effect in the post-program periods represents the program=s impact on the 
enrollment of poor children in school, which are stratified by grade completed, 
k = 0, 1, ..., 9 or more. The first hypothesis tested by the Adifferenced estimator@ of the 
program-level effects according to Figure 2 is as follows: 16 
Figure 1—Schematic comparison of the proportion of children enrolled in school at 
time period t 
Economic endowments of households 
Program selection of locality 
Poor households eligible for 
PROGRESA grants 
Not poor households and 
ineligible for grants 
     
PROGRESA localities  S1t  S3t 
Non-PROGRESA (Control) localities  S2t  S4t 
 
 
H1  D1 = (S1t !S 2t) > 0    Post-program period average, t = 3,4,5 . 
 
 
One way to investigate whether the P and E are randomized is to determine if the 
pre-program differences in enrollment rates between the poor children in PROGRESA 
and non-PROGRESA localities are, in fact, statistically not different from zero: 
 
H2       D1 = (S 1t ! S 2t) = 0  Pre-program period average,   t = 1,2 . 
 
Even if the program placement were random, statistical correlation between program 
designated areas and pre-program enrollments might exist fortuitously. If the pre-
program regional differences between eligible PROGRESA and control children were 
due to omitted variables that do not change over time in their impact on enrollment, the 
baseline pre-program differences in enrollments may be subtracted from that for the same 
children observed in the panel sample in post-program periods, and thus the difference in 
differences estimator (DD1) is defined as shown in Figure 2, which is expected to 17 
represent the positive impact of the program holding constant for persistent sources of 
pre-program variation: 
 
    H3  DD1 = D1(post-program) - D1(pre-program) > 0 . 
 
Program transfers are only available to children of poor households, and this 
targeting of the program is expected to affect the distribution of enrollment by income 
levels within the PROGRESA localities. The enrollment rate difference between nonpoor 
and poor households is expected to be positive before the program, and to decrease 
relative to that observed in non-PROGRESA localities after the program is initiated.  One 
possible measure of the program=s effect on inequality in enrollment is defined in Figure 
2: 
H 4  D2 < 0      Post-program period average,   t = 3,4,5 . 
 
But before the program started, the two types of localities are expected, under random 
assignment of the programs, to exhibit the same degree of income inequality in 
enrollments, and this null hypothesis of random program placement is again testable: 
 
H 5   D2 = 0     Pre-program period average,   t = 1,2 . 
 18 
A difference in differences estimator (DD2 defined in Figure 2) can again remove any 
time invariant sources of the preprogram regional variations in inequality, given the 
linear approximation postulated here: 
 
H 6  DD2 < 0 . 
 
Even if the randomization of program placement is not challenged, and H 2 and 
H 5 cannot be rejected, the difference in differences estimators are preferred to the post-  
 
Figure 2—Group differences representing effects of program grants 
I.  Program-control differences in outcomes among comparable-eligible (poor) groups: 
 
D1t = S1,t - S2,t . 
 
  Assumes program placement is orthogonal to all other factors affecting or correlated with outcomes 
variables. 
 
II  Double-differenced estimator of change in outcomes between program-control eligible groups over 
time: 
 
DD1t = (S1,t - S2,t) - (S1,t-1 - S2,t-1) . 
 
III.   Non-eligible-eligible differences between program and control regions measure program effect on 
reducing equality in access to schooling, or a measure of targeting effectiveness: 
 
D2t = (S3,t - S1,t) - (S4,t - S2,t) . 
 
IV.   Double-differenced estimator of change in inequality in outcome over time: 
 
DD2t = (S3,t - S1,t) - (S4,t - S2,t) - [(S3,t-1 - S1,t-1) - (S4,t-1 - S2,t-1)] . 
 
  Assumes all factors affecting economic group differences in Program and Control regions do not 
change over time. 
 19 
program differences, because they remove persistent sources of regional variation in 
enrollment. It may still be useful to add additional explicit control variables and estimate 
their marginal effects jointly with those of the program on the enrollment of poor 
children, because this should increase the statistical power of the model estimated at the 
level of the individual child to isolate significant effects attributable to the program 
treatment, if there are any (Manning, Newhouse, and Ware 1982). The estimated impact 
of the controls can also help to evaluate alternative policy options that might contribute to 
the social objective of increasing enrollment rates, particularly among the poor. 
 
4. ENROLLMENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROGRESA AND NON-
PROGRESA LOCALITIES 
Table 3 reports the values of D1 for each grade level in the pre-program and post-
program periods as well as the difference in differences over time or DD1, first for both 
sexes combined, and then for girls and boys separately. Beneath the difference in 
enrollment rates between the PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA localities, the statistical 
probability is reported (in parentheses) that the observed difference could have occurred 
randomly in a saturated probit model. If the conventional level of confidence required to 
accept the hypothesis is 5 percent or less, the D1 in the post-program surveys is 
significantly non-zero and positive after the first through sixth grades for both sexes 
combined. The largest difference in enrollment is for those children who had completed 
grade 6, and were thus qualified to enroll in junior secondary school; for this group, the  20 
Table 3—Differences between enrollment rates between PROGRESA and non-
PROGRESA poor children and over time 
  (significance levels in parentheses beneath differences)
a  
Pre-program difference of 
poor PROGRESA - non-
PROGRESA 
D1
b   
Post-program difference of 
poor PROGRESA - non-
PROGRESA 
D1
b   
Post-preprogram 






previous year  All  Female  Male    All  Female  Male    All   Female  Male 
0  .009  .010  .007    -.002  -.010  .006    -.011  -.021  -.001 
  (.351)  (.433)  (.615)    (.854)  (.564)  (.742)    (.482)  (.353)  (.969) 
1  .001  -.009  .010    .022  .007  .036    .020  .016  .025 
  (.410)  (.816)  (.376)    (.008)  (.418)  (.002)    (.136)  (.652)  (.070) 
2  -.004  -.013  .006    .020  .018  .021    .023  .031  .015 
  (.276)  (.386)  (.506)    (.009)  (.796)  (.001)    (.226)  (.693)  (.030) 
3  .015  .025  .005    .032  .013  .049    .017  -.012  .044 
  (.278)  (.162)  (.882)    (.008)  (.679)  (.001)    (.219)  (.508)  (.014) 
4  .008  -.016  .030    .041  .038  .044    .033  .055  .013 
  (.500  (.836)  (.266)    (.001)  (.261)  .001)    (.053)  (.335)  (.064) 
5  .015  .005  .025    .047  .055  .041    .032  .050  .017 
  (.129)  (.544)  (.125)    (.001)  (.232)  (.000)    (.146)  (.647)  (.077) 
6  .024  .048  -.019    .111  .148  .065    .087  .100  .085 
  (.345)  (.433)  (.002)    (.002)  (.001)  (.317)    (.004)  (.070)  (.005) 
7  -.012  -.005  -.015    .013  .025  .003    .025  .030  .018 
  (.894)  (.854)  (.958)    (.147)  (.533)  (.006)    (.378)  (.583)  (.062) 
8  -.030  -.051  -.016    .001  .015  -.010    .031  .066  .006 
  (.913)  (.932)  (.836)    (.162)  (.575)  (.100)    (.347)  (.687)  (.235) 
9 or more  .103  .327  -.156    .066  .111  .026    -.037  -.216  .182 
  (.534)  (.001)  (.006)    (.317)  (.042)  (.813)    (.914)  (.044)  (.020) 
a The differences are tested for being different from zero by fitting a linear regression model with discrete additive 
variables to fit the contingency table for enrollment rates illustrated in Figure 1, and then the coefficients are tested 
jointly with an F statistic for whether differences are zero. 
b  For definition of D1 and DD1, see Figures 1 and 2 and text. 
 
 
enrollment rate increases by 11.1 percentage points, from the level of 58 percent noted in 
the pre-program periods in Table 2 to about 69 percent. Note also that this program 
impact is disproportionately concentrated among girls, whose enrollment rate increases 21 
14.8 percentage points compared with the boys, whose enrollment increases 6.5 
percentage points. 
The pre-program values of D1 are positive in seven out of ten cases, but in none 
of these cases is the difference statistically different from zero, suggesting that the 
randomization of program placement with regard to prior enrollment levels as specified 
by hypothesis 2 is not rejected. Nonetheless, the difference in differences (DD1) estimate 
of the program=s impact on enrollment rates is reported in the last three columns in Table 
3, and they are also all positive from grades 1 to 8, and statistically significant for the 
groups having completed grades 4 and 6. The average value of D1 and DD1 over grades 
1 through 8 is of roughly similar magnitude for both sexes combined, 3.6 and 3.4 
percentage point increases in enrollment levels, respectively. 
Table 4 reports D2 from the pre-program and post-program periods and the DD2 
over time to assess whether the PROGRESA Program reduced inequality within localities 
between enrollments of nonpoor and poor. Since this measure is only one of many that 
might be devised to represent inequality, it is not a unique measure of program impact as 
in the case of the level effects.
11 The D2 differences are negative from grades 1 to 6 in the 
post-program period and statistically significant and negative after grades 4 through 6, 
implying the program reduces inequality, but the impact is largest after the last three  
                                                 
11 For example, one might be interested in how schooling gaps between children whose parents are better 
and worse educated changed with the onset of the PROGRESA Program, rather than measuring inequality 
with respect to the single threshold of the latent indicator of poverty defined as a condition of eligibility for 
PROGRESA transfers. 22 
Table 4—Difference between enrollment inequality between PROGRESA and non-
PROGRESA localities
a 
  (Significance levels in parentheses beneath differences)
b 
Pre-Program Differences 
D2    Post-Program Differences 
D2 





previous year  All  Female  Male    All  Female  Male    All  Female  Male 
0  .010  .009  .011    .049  .010  .094    .039  .001  .083 
  (.609)  (.752)  (.691)    (.063)  (.784)  (.014)    (.229)  (.978)  (.073) 
1  -.002  .010  -.013    -.032  -.034  -.030    -.030  -.044  -.017 
   (.904)  (.703)  (.601)    (.083)  (.205)  (.225)    (.259)   (.248)  (.640) 
2  -.009  -.012  -.006    -.027  -.011  -.040    -.018  .002  -.033 
  (.64)  (.646)  (.816)    (.099)  (.659)  (.069)    (.476)  (.962)  (.327) 
3  -.009  -.032  .012    -.027  -.016  -.037    -.018  .015  -.049 
  (.637)  (.243)  (.649)    (.083)  (.464)  (.091)    (.461)  (.661)  (.156) 
4  .002  .026  -.022    -.043  -.044  -.038    -.045  -.070  -.017 
  (.936)  (.327)  (.408)     (.007)  (.053)  (.087)    (.070)  (.046)  (.624) 
5  -.020  -.003  -.037    -.047  -.047  -.049    -.027  -.044  -.012 
  (.293)  (.909)  (.165)    (.003)  (.042)  (.025)    (.279)  (.220)  (.720) 
6  .042  -.009  .124    -.035  -.119  .061    -.077  -.110  -.064 
  (.023)  (.736)  (.000)    (.006)  (.000)  (.001)    (.001)  (.000)  (.048) 
7  .014  .010  .015    .002  .026  -.021    -.012  .016  -.036 
  (.627)  (.814)  (.710)    (.910)  (.369)  (.441)    (.738)  (.755)  (.457) 
8  .023  .024  .029    .002  -.026  .025    -.021  -.050  -.004 
  (.545)  (.665)  (.577)    (.936)  (.428)  (.406)    (.629)  (.438)  (.948) 
9 or more  -.022  -.284  .266    .014  .094  .110    .036  .190  -.156 
  (.726)  (.002)  (.003    (.551)  (.006)  (.000)    (.593)  (.049)  (.096) 
a For definition of D2 and DD2, see Figures 1 and 2 and text. 
b The differences are tested for statistical significance by fitting the enrollment rate contingency table as illustrated in 
Figure 1 by a linear  regression with discrete additive variables, and then coefficients are jointly tested for the 
differences being non-zero with the F-test. 
 
years of primary school. The pre-program values of D2 are not jointly statistically 
significantly different from zero, but it is different for grade 6, and in this case it is 
surprisingly positive. The difference in differences, DD2, is negative from grades 1 to 8, 
and is statistically significant for grade 6. The average values for DD2 for grades 1 
through 8 are larger in negative value than those of D2 post-program, !3.1 percentage 23 
points, compared with !2.6, respectively. There is evidence that the program has reduced 
income-related inequalities in enrollment within localities, as would be expected, based 
on the evidence presented earlier that the program induced an increase in the level of 
enrollments among the poorer households. 
 
5. RESPONSE OF ENROLLMENT PROBABILITIES TO PROGRAM AND 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the probit model for enrollment of the 
individual child are expressed as derivatives of enrollment with respect to the explanatory 
variables. The two program-associated enrollment effects on the poor are associated with 
living in a PROGRESA (P) locality and that of the PROGRESA-Eligible interaction (PE) 
as reported in rows 1 and 2 in Table 5, and summed to represent the net effect averaged 
across the three post-program survey rounds 3, 4, and 5. This net effect of the program is 
estimated separately for girls and boys, at the primary and secondary school levels, first 
for the panel sample that underlies the previously reported group-difference estimators, 
and also for the larger pooled sample of children. The Probit model additionally controls 
for the child=s age, mother=s and father=s years of schooling, primary school teacher- 
student ratio, distance to junior secondary school, and distances from the locality to urban 
areas (Schultz 2000b). In brackets beneath the program, net impact on the poor=s 
enrollment probability is the statistical probability that this net impact of the program is 24 
Table 5—Probit estimates of the effects of PROGRESA on the enrollment 
probability of the poor in the post-program periods 
Panel sample    Pooled sample 
Primary  Secondary    Primary  Secondary  Estimated derivatives at sample 
means  Female  Male  Female  Male    Female  Male  Female  Male 
















Poor eligible household in 

















Net PROGRESA impact 



















Sample size  33,795  36,390  13,872  14,523    55,396  59,344  25,761  26,696 
Pseudo R
2  .3587  .3512  .2890  .2715    .3659  .3635  .2994  .2847 
 
 
zero, according to a joint c
2 test associated with the likelihood ratio. The program=s net 
impact on enrollment is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 7 out of the 8 
possible tests for different sexes, school levels, and samples, and in the eighth sample, it 
satisfies the test at the 5 percent level. Thus, there appears to be a general positive 
enrollment effect of the program in the post-program surveys for both genders, both 
samples, and both school levels, with the inclusion of added control variables and the 
changes in sample composition.  
At the primary school level, the panel sample estimates imply that the average 
effect of the program across the three post-program rounds is to increase enrollment rates 
of girls by .96 percentage points, and boys by .74 percentage points, from the initially 
high enrollment rate of 94 percent (Appendix 2, Table 8). In the pooled sample, which 
has a lower initial enrollment rate of 90 percent, the program is associated with an 25 
increase in enrollment rates for girls of 1.45 and boys of 1.07 percentage points, 
according to the estimated probit model.   
At the secondary school level, the average enrollment effect of the program across 
the three post-program rounds in the panel sample is an increase of 9.3 percentage points 
for girls and 5.8 percentage points for boys, from their initial levels of 67 and 73 percent, 
respectively.
12 In the larger pooled sample the secondary school enrollment effects for 
girls average 7.2 percentage points and for boys, 3.5. The selectivity that may be built 
into the panel sample compared with the more inclusive pooled sample weakens the 
estimated life cycle effect of the program for boys and girls. 
The coefficients on the control variables are only described briefly here; they are 
reported fully elsewhere (Schultz 2000b). The estimated effect of one more year of 
mother’s schooling is to increase the probability of primary school enrollment for a 
daughter by .29 percentage points, and .18 for a son, whereas an added year of schooling 
of the father is associated with a .17 percentage point higher enrollment probability for a 
daughter and .26 for a son. Based also on the panel sample, at the junior secondary school 
level, the impacts are larger, with an additional year of the mother’s schooling increasing 
her daughters probability of being enrolled by 1.5 percentage points and her son by 1.1, 
while the father’s schooling is associated with an increase in his daughter’s enrollment by 
1.5 percentage points and his son’s by 2.0. They are in the anticipated directions of 
                                                 
12 Earlier results reported (Schultz 2000b) suggested that for boys, the program effect on enrollment 
declined on the later survey rounds, but this appears to have been due to an error in my matching of the 
grade completed in round 5. 26 
favoring the offspring of the same sex as the parent, but the differences of mother’s and 
father’s schooling are never statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see Thomas 
1994). 
Distance to secondary school is associated with lower secondary school 
enrollment, whereas the greater the distance to the Cabecera or to the nearest 
metropolitan center, the higher are enrollment rates, particularly at the secondary school 
level. Residing in a town that is only 50 kilometers from a metropolitan area, rather than 
the sample mean of about 100 kilometers, is associated with a secondary school 
enrollment rate being 5.5 percentage points lower for girls and 6.0 lower for boys. 
Nearby cities appear to dissuade rural children from enrolling for additional years in 
school, a challenging regularity for society to take into account as the transportation 
system improves and small towns become more closely integrated with neighboring 
cities. The poverty indicator used to target the PROGRESA transfer payments is 
associated with a significant reduction in enrollment rates of 0.9 percentage points at the 
primary level for both boys and girls, and 4.7 percentage points for girls and no 
significant effect for boys at the secondary level. This difference in the effect of 
household poverty on secondary school enrollments of boys and girls helps to explain 
why the PROGRESA educational grants as a poverty reduction program have increased 
the secondary school enrollment of girls more than that of boys (Schultz 1988).  
To explore other policies that might encourage schooling, two of the control 
variables in the probit model for enrollment can be interpreted as capturing the impact of 
traditional educational policies. First, access to secondary schools could be improved to 27 
stimulate greater enrollment. Twelve percent of the sample currently have to travel more 
than 4 kilometers to a junior secondary school. Building additional schools and staffing 
them so that these children reside only four kilometers from their junior secondary school 
is predicted to increase secondary school enrollments by .46 percentage points for girls 
and by .34 for boys.
13 A second policy constraint incorporated as a control variable in the 
probit model of enrollment is the teacher-student ratio in the local primary school. 
Currently about 15 percent of the primary school-aged children have a local primary 
school where the average class size is greater than 30. Building enough classrooms and 
providing the teachers to prevent any school from having an average class size in excess 
of 30 would, according to the estimated model, raise primary school enrollments by .1 
percentage points for both boys and girls. Neither of these traditional education-based 
“supply” policy options for increasing enrollment rates appears to be a particularly 
effective means for raising enrollment rates, and moreover, neither could readily be 
targeted to the poor as is possible with school subsidies in the PROGRESA Program. 
Table 6 compares the individual child probit-model estimates of the derivatives of 
the PROGRESA Program on school enrollment, averaged across the six years of primary 
school and three years of junior secondary school (Table 5), and the group-differenced 
estimates averaged across the grade levels 1 through 9 (Table 3). The probit estimates are  
                                                 
13 Other studies of education have also estimated that the enrollment effect of Adistance to school@ has a 
larger negative impact on enrollment for girls than on boys, particularly at the secondary school level (e.g., 
Tansel 1997), an expected pattern if parents are especially reluctant to send teenage daughters greater 
distances to school (King and Hill 1993). 28 
Table 6—Probit and differenced estimates of the average program effect on 
enrollment over grades 1–9 (in percentage point changes) 
Individual child Probit derivatives    Group panel sample differences 
  Post-Program  
Sample by sex  Panel Sample  Pooled Sample    D1  DD1 
Girls  3.74  3.37    3.43  3.50 
Boys  2.42  1.88    2.83  2.47 
Source: Tables 3 and 5. For example, DD1 is summed for grades in Table 3 and divided by 9; Probit derivatives for 
primary school multiplied by 6 plus secondary school multiplied by 3, divided by 9. 
 
 
based on two alternative samples—the panel and the larger pooled samples—whereas the 
group-differenced estimates rely on the panel sample to avoid changes in the composition 
of groups over time. The probit model adds 10 additional control variables, whereas the 
group-differenced estimates allow for program effects to differ for every grade, rather 
than only between primary and secondary school levels, as assumed in the probit 
specification. The estimated program effect on girls’ enrollments is relatively similar 
across statistical models, controls, and samples, varying narrowly between 3.4 and 3.7 
percentage points. In the case of enrollment probabilities of boys, the three estimates 
based on the panel sample are also of a similar value, ranging from 2.4 to 2.8 percentage 
points, but the probit model fit to the larger pooled sample suggests that the PROGRESA 
Program had a smaller effect on the enrollment of boys, on the order of 1.9 percentage 
points, on average. However approximated, the PROGRESA Program has had a 
significant impact of increasing the school enrollment rates among children in poor rural 
households, and my preferred estimates are those based on the difference in differences 
(DD1) that control for persistent unobserved factors that might have influenced the level 29 
of enrollments across these localities, which were administratively assigned to benefit 
from the first phase of the PROGRESA or be followed as controls. 
 
6. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRESA PROGRAM IN TERMS OF 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
Increases in enrollment rates attributed to the PROGRESA Program in Table 3 
can be cumulated to approximate the lifetime changes in years of enrollment that an 
average poor youth could expect to receive, if the PROGRESA Program were to become 
permanent. This cohort cumulation in enrollments is simulated in the first column of 
Table 7, based on the enrollment rates for the pre-program periods. These baseline 
figures imply that if a poor child had been once enrolled in school, and completed the 
first grade, he or she could expect in the PROGRESA localities to complete (on average) 
6.80 years of school by the end of junior secondary school (out of a possible 9 years). 
Relatively few children continue further in school without leaving the region. If the D1 
post-program enrollment effects from Table 3 are added to the baseline enrollment rates 
and cumulated for a cohort of children, this synthetic measure of expected years of post-
program enrollment increases to 6.95 years, or a gain over the baseline of .15 years of 
schooling. But conditions deteriorated in this two-year period, October 1997 to 
November 1999 (Handa et al. 2000), and in localities that did not benefit from the 
PROGRESA program, the expected cumulative school enrollment of a child fell in the 
three post-program rounds from 6.66 to 6.14 years of schooling, as shown in Table 7. The 30 
Table 7—Cumulative expected enrollment years for birth cohort of poor children 
who enroll and complete grade 1 
Preprogram Rounds 1 and 2 
  Post-Program 
Rounds 3, 4, and 5   
Difference in 
Differences 








DI  DDI 
  1  .977  .975    .975  .953    .022  .020 
  2  .936  .938    .939  .899    .040  .042 
  3  .896  .884    .904  .837    .067  .041 
  4  .856  .838    .866  .768    .098  .080 
  5  .816  .786    .825  .695    .130  .100 
  6  .464  .428    .511  .352    .159  .121 
  7  .436  .407    .484  .330    .154  .125 
  8  .414  .399    .450  .306    .144  .129 














Years enrolled                 
  Females  6.66  6.62    6.95  6.19    .76  .72 
  Males  6.93  6.72    6.96  6.11    .85  .64 
 
 
cumulative enrollment of the poor is .81 years greater in the PROGRESA localities (6.95) 
than in the non-PROGRESA (control) localities (6.14) in the post-program rounds of the 
survey, or based on D1 evaluated post-program. According to the difference in 
differences (DD1), which corrects for persistent pre-program differences in enrollments, 
the gain in cumulative enrollment of the poor is .66 years, which is accepted here as the 
preferred (and minimum) estimate of the program=s long-term effect on child schooling 
attainment. This DD1 program gain is slightly larger for girls, .72 years of additional 
schooling, than for boys, .64 years. From their baseline in schooling before the program 
started, expected educational enrollment through junior secondary school is expected to 
increase for girls by 11 percent in the PROGRESA localities, closing the gender 
differential in schooling among these poor families. Although the social experimental 31 
intervention of the PROGRESA program appears to have been relatively uncorrelated 
with initial levels (and inequality) of enrollment rates as tested by H2 (and H5), the pre-
program differences between program and control localities are nonetheless 
conservatively taken into account in the difference in differences estimator (DD1).  
Estimates of the wage structure for men and women in 39 metropolitan areas of 
Mexico based on a 1996 Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano) imply that 
wages for both men and women are approximately 12 percent higher for each year of 
secondary school they have completed, and these estimates are robust to whether sample 
selection bias is corrected (Parker 1999). Matching the rural communities surveyed here 
to these return estimates in the nearest metropolitan area, one also finds that this pattern 
of 12 percent private returns to secondary school is a reasonable approximation for what 
youth in these PROGRESA Program areas of Mexico could expect to receive if they had 
resided in their nearest urban labor market. However, the comparable returns to primary 
schooling are only about 5 percent per year in these same urban areas, revealing an 
increasingly common pattern in the world in which private returns to secondary schooling 
are markedly higher than those to primary schooling (Schultz 1988).  
Unfortunately, there are insufficient wage earners in the rural population surveys 
to estimate a local wage return in agriculture. Most workers in these rural areas are self-
employed farmers. To estimate the effect of education on a farmer=s profits, additional 
data are required which were not available in the PROGRESA census and surveys. When 
farm production functions are estimated in the United States or in low-income countries, 
the implied internal rate of return to the farmer=s schooling is generally of a similar 32 
magnitude as the returns to schooling for urban wage earners (Huffman 2000).
14 
However, a large share of the youth from these rural localities currently migrates to the 
city to find their adult livelihood. The wage gains realized by an average youth who 
becomes better educated in these rural areas are likely, therefore, to be larger than those 
estimated within urban areas, because better educated rural youth are more likely to 
migrate to an urban destination (Schultz 1988). The monthly wage for an average worker 
in the urban areas in 1996 is 1,300 pesos, which is used here as the benchmark for wage 
opportunities in 1999. 
One further piece of information is needed to approximate the internal rate of 
return to the PROGRESA educational grants: this is the share of potential beneficiaries of 
the program who are qualified to enroll at each schooling level who enroll and receive the 
PROGRESA educational grant (Table 1). The surveys provide a post-program estimate of 
the proportion of poor-eligible children residing in a PROGRESA locality who are 
enrolled, given that they had completed the requisite number of years of schooling to 
qualify. Weighting grades 2 to 8 equally, one obtains an average estimate of 87 percent of 
the eligibles enrolled who could attend grades 3 through 9 in the three post-program 
                                                 
14 No variation in wages is assumed by age or correction for the growth in nominal wages in the three years 
1996 to 1999, when the last PROGRESA survey was collected. Implicitly, the relative wage structure by 
educational attainment is assumed constant, whereas in reality, the returns have been increasing over time. 
As noted earlier, no upward adjustment in the returns is made for the probability of rural-urban migration 
increasing wage opportunities for the rural youth who attend school more years. The net effect of these 
simplifications in the expected lifetime earnings calculation probably understates the human capital returns 
to PROGRESA grants. Any such estimate clearly embodies many sources of uncertainty, given the gaps in 
my information on migration and rural earnings opportunities of youth in these rural regions of Mexico. 33 
surveys. The proportion of the qualified poor youth who actually receive PROGRESA 
payments in the November 1999 survey is 72.5 percent, averaged over grades 3 to 9. 
The five pieces of information needed to calculate the internal rate of return to the 
PROGRESA Program are now specified. If the Program educational grants (Table 1) are 
viewed as the investment expenditures of the PROGRESA Program, which are only paid 
to 73 percent of the potential beneficiaries, and the impact of these program subsidies is 
to increase the educational attainment of the cohort of poor youth by .66 years of 
schooling (Table 7, DD1), for which the youth earn a 12 percent higher wage per year of 
schooling over their adult lifetimes (age 18 to 65), based on the 1996 urban average 
wage, then the PROGRESA educational payments are earning an internal rate of return of 
about 8 percent per year, in addition to their role of reducing current poverty.  
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The level of enrollment rates of comparably poor children in PROGRESA 
localities (treatment) are higher than in non-PROGRESA localities (control) in the three 
survey rounds collected after September 1998, when the PROGRESA program began 
dispensing educational grants to poor mothers whose children were enrolled in school in 
grades 3 through 9 and attended school at least 85 percent of the time. This difference 
estimator of PROGRESA=s impact on the enrollments of the poor is reported in Table 3 
(D1 > 0, post-program). It is statistically significantly different from zero within each 
distinguished group of children who had completed grades 1 through 6 in the previous 34 
year.   These differences are larger for girls than boys, as seen in Table 3. To confirm the 
independence of the placement of the PROGRESA Program from enrollments and the 
definition of eligibility, the regional differences in enrollment by the poor are also 
calculated before the program started and shown not to differ significantly from zero 
(Table 3, D1 = 0, pre-program). Difference in differences over time confirms a slightly 
smaller program impact on enrollment as evident in the difference in differences (DD1) 
estimator (Table 6), which is plotted in Figures 3 and 4. The cumulative cohort effect of 
the program, based on the difference in differences estimator, is an increment of .66 years  
 








on the baseline level of 6.80 years of schooling, which is recorded in the pre-program 
rounds of the surveys. 
The PROGRESA program targets its educational subsidies to the very poor, even 
in the geographically restricted, relatively immobile, poor rural communities. It is also 
shown that these targeted transfer payments have the effect of reducing the inequality in 
school enrollments within the PROGRESA localities compared with that in the non-
PROGRESA localities (Table 4, D2 < 0 post-program), and they are statistically 
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significant after grades 4 through 6. The pre-program inequality differences between the 
PROGRESA and non-PROGRESA localities are not jointly statistically significant. The 
estimated difference in differences in enrollment inequality over time (Table 4, DD2) is 
negative and statistically significant after grade 6, and slightly larger overall than the D2 
measured post-program. 
One way to assess whether a roughly two-thirds of a year increment in schooling 
is worth the cost of the PROGRESA Program is to compare the expected program 
payments to the resulting expected increase in adult productivity of the students who 
stand to benefit from a permanently established PROGRESA Program. If the current 
urban wage differentials approximate what the program beneficiaries can expect to earn 
from their schooling in terms of future percentage increases in their wages, a rough 
estimate of the internal rate of return to the educational transfers provided by the program 
is 8 percent per year in real terms (adjusted for inflation). This would appear to be a 
reasonable rate of return if the program were designed only to foster human capital 
investments. But it is clearly more than this, since it is channeled to the poor and operates 
to reduce current poverty and raise current consumption levels. For the majority of the 
poor rural families whose children would have attended school without the program=s 
educational grants, the PROGRESA outlays are pure income transfers. But for the 
roughly one in twenty who are induced to enroll their child in school, they may 
experience a decrease in their children=s supply of labor to work in the labor force or in 
household production. But as described in Appendix 1, although there is such a child 
labor supply response associated with the family being eligible for PROGRESA 37 
educational grants, the magnitude of the response is modest and cannot eliminate the 
consumption gains of the program to poor families (see Ravallion and Wodon 2000).  
Another possible side effect of the PROGRESA Program could be on fertility, for 
the educational grants would appear to subsidize parents for the cost of a child=s 
schooling, which might reduce the private cost of an additional child. Other studies that 
have sought to estimate the effect of a reduction in the cost of schooling on fertility have 
found that the income uncompensated cross-price effect is positive and outweighs the 
associated income effect, leading to the empirical finding that children and child 
schooling are substitutes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, 1982). In the Mexican panel 
sample analyzed here, there is also no statistical evidence that poor women who had a 
PROGRESA-eligible child who had completed grades 2 through 8 were more likely to 
have a birth in the six months preceding the November 1999 survey than comparable 
women residing in a non-PROGRESA locality.
15 
                                                 
15 To evaluate the possible effect of the PROGRESA Program on fertility, the final survey round collected 
in November 1999 is analyzed, and the probability of having a birth between this round and the previous 
one in May 1999 is estimated in a probit specification corrected for cluster design as a function of the 
woman=s age, years of schooling, being designated poor (and eligible for program grants if resident in a 
PROGRESA locality), whether resident in a PROGRESA locality, and the interaction of poor and 
PROGRESA. The last two variables (PROGRESA and PROGRESA-Poor interaction) are also added only 
for those women who have a child who is eligible for PROGRESA educational grants, having completed in 
the previous school year grades 1 through 8. The coefficients on these last two variables are reported in 
Appendix 2, Table 10, and their sum is viewed as an estimate of the PROGRESA Program=s effect on 
fertility. This program effect is estimated for all women age 20 to 49 with the additional control for the 
woman=s age squared, and for the five-year age brackets 20-24, 25-29, etc., with only the linear age control 
variable. It may be noted that no mothers age 15-19 had children of school age and thus the program is 
presumed to have had no estimable effect on the fertility of this youngest group of women who could bear 
children. For all women, the derivative of fertility with respect to the placement of the PROGRESA 
program is negative for women age 35-39 and 40-44, and approaches significance at the 10 percent level. 
For the eligible mothers, there is a statistically significant effect only for the age group 20-24, where the 
effect is positive, but collinearity prevents estimation of the two interaction variable coefficients jointly. In 
the available time frame, I would conclude that there are no consistent and statistically significant effects of 
the program on fertility. 38 
Other traditional poverty reduction programs, such as income-support welfare 
systems or price-support agricultural programs, offer no empirical evidence or theoretical 
reason to expect that these programs encourage investments in human capital or promote 
a more efficient allocation of private or social resource. Indeed both of these common 
forms of poverty programs—supporting incomes and output prices—are related to major 
distortions in the allocation of the family=s labor and other resources of the beneficiaries. 
These types of resource distortion are minimized by the design of PROGRESA (to 
involve only Apure income effects@).  
Although it is not always a politically popular feature of a welfare program 
focused on poor areas, PROGRESA should help the children of poor Mexican farmers 
find a better place to work, by encouraging them to invest in schooling, which in turn 
facilitates the migration of these young people from their origin communities to other 
parts of the Mexican economy, where wages and long-term career opportunities are more 
attractive. Thus, it should be expected that PROGRESA will encourage the interregional 
migration that is needed at the macro-economic level to ease the extreme poverty that has 
persisted for generations in the more remote rural parts of Central and Southern Mexico. 
Subsidizing schooling among the rural poor may be a development strategy that deserves 
more attention as a promising targeted policy in many parts of the world that can both 




DESCRIBING THE EFFECTS OF PROGRESA ON RELATED FAMILY 
DEMAND BEHAVIOR 
The PROGRESA Program, by reducing the price of schooling for children in poor 
families, may affect the demand of these families for a variety of related goods and 
consumer behavior. According to the Slutsky decomposition, the effect of the program 
can be thought of as having a pure income effect that should raise the demand for all 
Anormal@ goods, and a cross-price effect that should reduce the demand for substitutes 
and increase demand for complements of the child=s schooling. Because of the child=s 
time constraint, it might be expected that a program that caused an increase in school 
enrollment would be associated with an offsetting decrease in child labor supply to work 
in the labor market and in the home. Indeed, some advocates of policies to reduce child 
labor hold out the promise that decreasing child labor would lead to increasing the 
schooling of the same children and thereby improve the child=s future economic 
opportunities (i.e., that the income uncompensated effect of a ban on child labor would be 
to increase schooling). This claim, however, not only assumes substitution between child 
schooling and work (i.e., a positive cross-price effect) but also anticipates that the cross-
price effect dominates the income effect that would in this case operate in opposite 
direction and reduce the demand for schooling. 
Measuring child labor may be more difficult than it would seem. Household 
surveys in low-income countries do not generally find as large a proportion of children 40 
working as expected by social observers. The PROGRESA census and surveys asked the 
respondent in all five rounds whether a child age 8 to 18 worked. A second question 
followed up those who reported the child as not working by a further line of inquiry as to 
whether the child produced something that was sold in the market. A third question was 
addressed in round 3 to respondents who had answered negatively the two previous 
questions, asking whether the child was engaged in any housework. Finally, for children 
working in paid labor, they were asked how many hours they worked last week. The full 
sequence of questions were administered only in round 3 and 5 on which this analysis is 
based.
16 Summing the children reported as working in the first two questions yields 2.5 
percent of the girls prepared for primary school as working, and 7.6 percent of the 
comparable boys as working (see sample means in Appendix 2, Table 9, and for ages, see 
Table 2 and Appendix 2, Table 9). Of the secondary school qualified girls, 8.3 percent 
work, whereas 28.4 percent of the boys work. The number of hours worked for pay per 
week is .09 and .36 for primary school girls and boys, whereas the average hours rises to 
.48 and 1.76 for the secondary school girls and boys, respectively. Except for teenage 
males, the labor force participation rates appear relatively low. 
However, adding to the participation rate those children who contribute to 
housework, the primary school girls’ participation rate rises to 12.5 percent and the 
secondary school girls’ participation increases to 33.2 percent, roughly equivalent to that 
                                                 
16 In round 3 the three questions were 59, 60, and 62, whereas in round 5, they were, respectively, numbers 
50, 51, and 53. In rounds 1 and 2 the third question on housework was omitted and the hours worked in 
paid activity was omitted from round 4. 41 
of boys. Clearly, housework is a relatively more common activity for girls than boys, and 
conversely for market labor force participation.  
The estimates of the probit model are reported in Appendix 2, Table 9 to explain 
the probability that a child participates in (1) the labor force or housework and (2) in only 
the labor force, whereas a regression is fit in (3) to hours worked for pay last week. In 
comparison with poor children in non-PROGRESA localities (controls), the PROGRESA 
Program=s effect is the sum of the PROGRESA resident coefficient plus the coefficient 
on the interaction of the PROGRESA and Poor dummies that makes the family eligible 
for the educational grants if the child is regularly enrolled. This program effect expressed 
as a derivative suggests that only the secondary school boys respond to PROGRESA by 
significantly (p < .05) reducing their labor force participation (2) by 3.6 percent. When 
the housework is also included in participation (1), the primary males exhibit a significant 
response of reducing participation by 1.6 percent, the secondary females reduce their 
participation by 4.1 percent, whereas the secondary males reduce their participation by 
3.4 percent, though the significance of this last estimate does not satisfy the conventional 
5 percent threshold. The child=s hours of paid work also tend to be reduced in the 
PROGRESA-Eligible families, but the amounts are small: .04 hours per week for primary 
females and .11 hours for primary males, by .21 hours for secondary males, whereas the 
response is not statistically significant for secondary females. 
Although the responses in child labor supply are in the direction expected, they 
are smaller in magnitude than the enrollment increases. Others have found the same 
pattern (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999, 2000). According to Table 5 and Appendix 2, 42 
Table 9, the program-induced increase in secondary school enrollment of 9.3 percentage 
points for girls is associated with a 4.1 percent decline in girls working in the labor force 
or in housework, but by only .4 percent when housework is excluded. Secondary school 
males increase their total labor force participation by 3.6 percentage points, while they 
increase their enrollment rate by 5.8 percentage points (Table 5). If the reduction in hours 
of work by the secondary school males occurs entirely among the 6.9 percent who 
enrolled due to the PROGRESA Program grants, it is possible that these boys reduced 
their paid work by 3.0 hours per week (i.e., 3.0 = .21/.0694). These findings from a 
randomized social experiment imply, as the non-experimental cross sectional estimates of 
Ravallion and Wodon (2000) suggest, that the enrollment effect of secondary school 
fellowships (or PROGRESA grants) reduced by only a small fraction the time 
Bangladesh (Mexican) children worked. Duraisamy (2000) also finds that a large fraction 
of Indian teenage children are neither in the labor force nor enrolled in school, suggesting 
that increasing enrollments need not depress proportionately child work or reduce 
substantially family earnings. These estimates suggest that most of the educational grants 
transferred to the poor families by PROGRESA increase the family=s resources and are 
only marginally offset by a reduction in child labor. 
Appendix 2, Table 10 reports a similar analysis of fertility behavior between the 
fourth and fifth surveys. There is no evidence in this six-month rate of births to suggest 
that the uncompensated schooling price reduction introduced by PROGRESA had any 
significant effect on fertility. This finding is also consistent with other studies that have 
sought to estimate the uncompensated cross-price effect from schooling to fertility or the 43 
effect of random variation in fertility on schooling as instrumented by the occurrence of 
twins (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, 1982; Schultz 1997). 44 
APPENDIX TABLES  
Table 8—Means and standard deviations of all variables examined in enrollment models for panel and pooled 
samples, by primary and secondary school and by sex
a 
Sample 1–Panel    Sample 2–Pooled 
Primary
b    Secondary
c    Primary
b    Secondary
c 
Variable name  Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male 
Sample size  33,795  36,390    13,872  14523    55,396  59,344    25,761  26,696 
Enrollment  .942  .937    .674  .730    .896  .898    .578  .635 
Attendance
d  .972  .971    .981  .980    .970  .968    .982  .978 
PROGRESA locality  .605  .613    .600  .625    .612  .618    .606  .629 
Eligible (poor)  .733  .735    .603  .622    .726  .731    .587  .592 
PROGRESA-eligible  .454  .462    .369  .408    .448  .456    .362  .383 
Completed schooling 
  0  .127  .120          .183  .172       
  1  .169  .173          .175  .185       
  2  .181  .187          .167  .170       
  3  .188  .186          .171  .172       
  4  .173  .171          .155  .155       
  5  .161  .163          .148  .149       
  6        .557  .504          .551  .491 
  7        .200  .220          .166  .185 
  8        .139  .160          .135  .157 
  9 or more        .104  .116          .148  .167 
Age of child 
  6  .068  .063    .000  .000    .090  .083    .000  .000 
  7  .115  .110    .000  .000    .124  .120    .000  .000 
  8  .152  .151    .000  .000    .138  .135    .000  .000 
  9  .155  .148    .000  .000    .133  .129    .000  .000 
  10  .165  .157    .002  .001    .142  .140    .001  .001 
  11  .142  .135    .029  .031    .123  .120    .022  .023 
  12  .098  .106    .162  .142    .089  .096    .121  .107 
  13  .047  .057    .249  .225    .047  .054    .192  .172 
  14  .027  .035    .246  .254    .032  .037    .207  .211 
  15  .014  .020    .189  .203    .024  .028    .211  .215 
  16  .007  .009    .104  .123    .020  .022    .187  .204 





































                    (continued)  
Sample 1–Panel    Sample 2–Pooled 
Primary
b    Secondary
c    Primary
b    Secondary
c 
Variable name  Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male    Female  Male 
Mother not present  .047  .049    .047  .048    .062  .062    .068  .061 
Father not present  .103  .108    .108  .114    .127  .125    .132  .130 
School characteristics 
















  No information on primary school  .293  .290    .301  295  .  .301  .298    .300  .295 
















  No distance to secondary school  .022  .016    .009  .008    .029  .024    .011  .010 
Community characteristics 
































Community daily agricultural wage: 
































  No wage for men  .021  .022    .017  .026    .029  .031    .026  .032 
  No wage for women  .562  .570    .583  .575    .549  .565    .576  .568 
a  The standard deviations of continuous variables are reported in parentheses beneath their means. In the case of binary dummy variable (= 1 or 0), the standard 
deviation is a function of the mean ( ) 1 ( mean mean SD - = ). 
b  Primary sample includes all children ages 6–16 who have completed from 0 to 5 years of school and are thus qualified to enroll in primary school grades 1–6. 
C  Secondary sample includes all children ages 6–16 who have completed from 6 to 9 or more years of schooling and are thus qualified to enroll in secondary 
school. 
d  Attendance rate based on those who are enrolled and respond to the attendance question. Thus, for primary female panel sample, 70.8 percent of all girls report an 
attendance rate of 97.2 percent. But of those 94.2 percent who are reported to be enrolled, 21.4 percent do not answer the attendance question. 
e  Variable mean and standard deviation based on entire sample where nonreporters are set to zero and the subsequent dummy is included in the regression. Thus in the 
case of primary student-teacher ratio, the mean for reporting schools is 24.6 (17.43/(1.0-.292). 
f  Distance measured from locations in Hidalgo (State) and the nearest of four cities (Queretaro, Puebla, Tampico, or Mexico City), in Michoacan (State) from Morelia 
(Capital), in Puebla from Puebla, in Queretaro from Queretaro, in San Luis Potosi from San Luis Potosi, in Veracruz and Veracruz, and in Guerrero from Acapulco 
(largest city in State). 
 
 47 
Table 9—Probit and regression estimates of the effect of PROGRESA on the 
probability that poor children work in the labor force or in housework if 
eligible for education grants: Rounds 3 and 5 
Primary    Secondary 
Explanatory variables  Female  Male    Female  Male 
 
Child works or helps in housework 


























Sample size  17,912  19,396    10,702  11,270 






















Sample size  17,912  19,363    10,702  11,270 
Sample mean of market work question  .0248  .0764    .0828  .2840 
 
Hours child works for pay 










Sample size  17,654  18,757    10,429  10,362 
Sample mean hours  .0866  .356    .480  1.76 
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Table 10—Probit estimates of derivatives between program eligibility and 
probability of birth in six months prior to November 1999, by women’s 
age
a 
Age of woman in November 1999  20–49  20–24  25–29  30–34  35–39  40–44
b  45–49
b 
     
Mothers with child who had completed 2 to 8 years of education interacted with:     
PROGRESA locality  -.0024 
(.27) 








































Mean of birth rate  .0411  .0615  .0655  .0468  .0335  .0138  .0027 
Sample size  17,434  3,661  3,327  2,972  2,803  2,457  2,214 
a  Probit maximum likelihood estimates with cluster occurrence weighting for heteroscedasticity (Huber 1967). Other 
controls made age, years of mother’s education, and poor, with a quadratic term or age for the sample for all age 
groups covered. No women ages 15–19 had children of relevant school age. 
b  Colinearity restricted specification to include only PROGRESA and PROGRESA-Poor interaction for mothers of 
children in PROGRESA-eligible group. 
c  Colinearity between PROGRESA and PROGRESA-poor interaction led to near singularity. Removal of 
PROGRESA with eligible beneficiaries converged. Linear probability model led to more stable results with all 
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